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MICHAEL D. WAGNER
“A FEW DAYS LATER IN COMING”
MAJOR GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT’S ROLE IN THE
AROOSTOOK WAR
Maine Soldier’s Song
We are marching on to Madawask,
To fight the trespassers;
We 'll teach the British how to walk,
And come off conquers.
We 'll have our land right good and clear, 
For all the English say;
They shall not cut another log 
Nor stay another day.
They better march and stay at home,
And mind their business there;
The way we treated them before,
Made all the nations stare.
We 'll feed them well with ball and shot, 
We 'll cut these Red-coats down,
Before we yield to them an inch,
Or title of our ground.
Onward! my lads so brave and true 
Our country's right demands 
With justice, and with glory fight,
For these Aroostook lands.1
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John Mitchell’s m ap of 1755, used during the treaty negotiations between the United 
States and Great Britain after the Revolutionary War, provided no geographical basis for 
determ ining the location o f the St. Croix River o r the “highlands” that separated the 
rivers diat flowed into the Atlantic from those that flowed into the St. Lawrence. Maine’s 
boundaries were left vague until the issue was setded in 1842.
Henry S. Burrage, MAINE IN  THE NO RTH EAST BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY (1919).
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“The members was [sic] ordered to appear at this place on 
Wednesday the 20th day of February [1839] at 8 o ’clock AM 
armed and equipped as the law directs with 3 days provisions and 
blankets and 24 ball cartridges.”2 With this order, read before its 
twenty-nine assembled members, the Bangor Rifle Corps mobi­
lized for war with New Brunswick. Only two weeks earlier, the 
unit met to elect William H. Mills to serve as captain of the 
company.3 Now the entire unit was on the march, just one of the 
forty-six companies mobilized from Maine’s militia to defend the 
northeastern boundary. Although history has obscured the 
significance of the Aroostook War, the conflict threatened to 
spark a third war between the United States and Great Britain in 
the course of a generation. Between 1837 and 1839, several 
skirmishes occurred along the border from Ohio to Maine; many 
dissidents saw this growing discord as a call to arms to expel 
Great Britain forever from the North American continent. That 
the United States avoided this unfortunate course of action 
depended to a large extent on President Martin Van Buren’s best 
trouble shooter, Major General Winfield Scott. Called to the 
border to soothe tensions, Scott combined a credible military 
threat with his reputation as a pacifier to quell the dispute and 
establish a lasting basis for settlement.
Troubles between the people of the United States and 
Great Britain were renewed during the 1837 French-Canadian 
revolt against British rule. New Brunswick at this time was still 
a colony of Great Britain, and it was the British military that acted 
to keep order. British subjects easily accepted this relationship, 
but French descendants continued to seek autonomy. President 
Martin Van Buren issued a proclamation demanding the neutral­
ity of United States citizens during the revolt, but this had little 
effect. American agitators along the border often aided the 
French Canadians and continued to arm themselves for war.4
This history of tension between the United States and Great 
Britain gave Maine’s mobilization considerably more support 
than it normally should have gathered. Maine’s governor, John 
Fairfield, a Boston editor reasoned, had it “in his power to 
become second only to Moses and Washington....In six months,
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he may with ease overrun the whole of Canada, and in six months 
more organize it as a Republican Government, and become 
himself its President, or divide it into three or four Republican 
States, and join our Federal Union.”5 While an exaggeration of 
Maine’s military potential, the editorial nevertheless suggests the 
broader intentions of some of the conflict’s supporters. Presi­
dent Van Buren’s woes were com pounded by Maine’s determi­
nation to settle the dispute by military means. Van Buren 
realized that if the forces of Maine and New Brunswick collided 
on the border, the conflict could not be confined to the disputed 
territory. His only chance for success remained a settlement 
without a clash of arms.
T he roots of the boundary conflict date back to die end of the Revolutionary War. The 1783 Treaty of Paris established the border based upon the 1755 
map by John Mitchell (see map 1). However, when Mitchell drew 
the map he had only a vague geographical knowledge of the 
region. Several incorrectly plotted river courses left the treaty
In 1839 G overnorJohn Fairfield (left) sent 
Land Agent Rufus M clntire (right) into the 
disputed territory to break up the camps m ade by trespassing loggers. M clntire was 
captured by New Brunswickers and jailed in Fredericton. Buirage, M AINE IN  THE  
NORTHEAST BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY; John Francis Sprague, “The North Eastern 
Boundary Controversy and the Aroostook War" in COLLECTIONS OF THE PISCATAQUIS 
COUNTY HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 1910).
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open to interpretation along the Maine-New Brunswick border. 
This contested area became of great significance to Great 
Britain, since it included the only winter supply line between 
New Brunswick and Quebec. Britain feared that should war 
again develop between the two nations, the United States would 
be in an easy position to cut off communication between the 
maritime and inland provinces.6
To further inflame the dispute, the territory comprised 
2,905 square miles of valuable pineland. Maine’s lumber pro­
duction was second in the nation by 1820, and the state sought 
more timberland for its voracious mills. New Brunswick’s 
lumber trade experienced similar growth.7 The conflict over 
timber escalated in January 1839 when Governor Fairfield 
ordered a civil posse into the territory to “break up the camps, 
and disperse those [New Brunswickers] who are engaged in the 
work of devastation and pillage.”8 The Maine Legislature sent 
State Land Agent Rufus Mclntire and a posse o f200 men into the 
territory. Although the posse traveled as a civil force, it brought 
along a brass six-pounder cannon to ensure that the New 
Brunswickers listened.9
New Brunswick’s lieutenant governor, John Harvey, pub­
lished an official proclamation expressing dissatisfaction with 
the posse’s presence in the disputed territory. Harvey took 
special care in this memorandum to address himself as a major 
general and commander in chief of New Brunswick’s forces, 
titles that indicated his willingness to use military force. In the 
same order, Harvey called out troops sufficient to repel the 
“foreign invasion” by Maine. He also prepared to mobilize the 
constitutional militia force of New Brunswick, “should occasion 
require.”10
In the disputed territory, a group of fifty Canadian lumber­
men captured Mclntire during the night and escorted him to a 
jail in Fredericton. Receiving diis news, Fairfield ordered 
another 200 men to the region. In a private letter, Fairfield 
claimed that “We experienced no difficulties in procuring men 
to go on this service against the trespassers. On the contrary, it 
is hard work to keep them back.” He ordered the Maine posse
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Following M clntire:s capture, Governor Fairfield called for a fortified position in 
Towship 10, at present-day Masardis. State and province began preparations for war.
Wilbur Curtiss map of the Disputed Territory (1839)
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to fortify at Township no. 10 (see map 2) and then appointed 
Charles Jarvis to replace Mclntire as the acting State Land 
Agent.11
Jarvis’ appointment as land agent was significant. Unlike 
Mclntire, he was a colonel in the militia. Although Jarvis was 
officially acting in a civilian position, Maine no longer expected 
a peaceful settlement. Fairfield mobilized another 850 infantry­
men and 150 artillerymen for three-months service on the 
border to support the posse. Major General Isaac Hodsdon took 
command of the militia and prepared to march to the Aroostook.12
The relations between Maine and New Brunswick rapidly 
deteriorated as both sides mobilized for war. Harvey demanded 
Fairfield recall the Maine forces: “Otherwise, I have no alterna­
tive but to take military occupation of that territory.”13 Threat 
followed threat. Dispatches from the border reported the arrival 
of the 36th British Regiment from the West Indies, with three 
more regiments expected. That same day, Fairfield ordered all 
10,343 members of the Maine militia to prepare for an immedi­
ate call to arms. The Maine Legislature appropriated $800,000 
to carry out Fairfield’s resolve to remove all British trespassers 
from Maine territory. Fairfield immediately requested help 
from President Van Buren, and the legislatures of Ohio, New 
York, Illinois, Alabama, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Indi­
ana, Massachusetts, and Kentucky all promised aid.14
Since the 1837 French Canadian Revolt, Van Buren had employed Major General Scott along the North American border from Ohio to Vermont. As com­
manding general of the Eastern Division, Scott moved constantly 
among the states to monitor troubles and keep the peace. His 
position often brought him into contact with British authorities, 
and he earned among them a reputation for integrity. Scott was 
acting in this role when the crisis on the Maine-New Brunswick 
border began.15
Van Buren immediately ordered Scott back to Washing­
ton.16 The president believed Scott’s involvement was necessary 
to prevent a war most observers saw as inevitable. Scott traveled 
for three days to reach Washington, and during that time
WINFIELD SCOTT AND THE AROOSTOOK WAR
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Secretary of StateJohn Forsyth and British Prime Minister Henry 
S. Fox communicated frequently. On February 27 they pro­
posed a settlement known as the Fox-Forsyth agreement: “Her 
Majesty’s officers will not seek to expel, by military force, the 
armed party which as been sent by Maine into the district 
bordering on the Aroostook River; but the Government of 
Maine will, voluntarily, and without needless delay, withdraw, 
beyond the bounds of the disputed territory, any armed force 
now within them .”17 Although the two nations agreed on paper, 
the difficult task of keeping Maine and New Brunswick at peace 
would rest on Scott’s shoulders.
As tensions m ounted 
on die Maine frontier, 
President Van Buren 
ordered Scott to 
W ashington. Scott left 
for Augusta with 
orders to restore 
peace and “enforce 
the determ ination o f 
die G overnm ent.” 
William M. Holland, 
THE LIFE AND  
POLITICAL 
OPINIONS OF 
M ARTIN  VANBUREN  
(1835).
Van Buren’s decision to use Scott was well calculated. At six 
feet, five inches and two hundred and eighty pounds, S tott fit the 
image of a general. His trademark uniforms, covered with braid, 
and his cocked hat with large white ostrich plumes completed the 
look and earned him his nickname, “Old Fuss and Feathers.” 
Scott was also well respected on both sides of the Atlantic. 
During the War of 1812, he earned a reputation as a military
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genius. His prior experience in settling conflicts on the northern 
border also weighed into Van Buren’s decision. British officials 
were willing to negotiate with him, and should these negotiations 
fail, the army would benefit from his military expertise.18 No one 
was more qualified to take command of the 60,000 soldiers in the 
federal forces and state militias.
Van Buren’s use of Scott was also linked to the president’s 
concern to reduce partisan bickering over the northeastern 
boundary. The Whig general had aided the Democratic presi­
dent in lobbying members of Congress in past instances, and in 
Maine, partisanship was indeed high. Democrats controlled all 
three branches of the state government after 1838, but their hold 
was precarious. By sending a Whig to negotiate, Van Buren 
hoped that he would reduce the suspicions of ulterior political 
motives.19
However, it was Scott’s position as military commander on 
the scene that served as the deciding factor for peace. Edward 
Mansfield, Scott’s official biographer, made the claim in 1848 
that “the questions of peace or war have much oftener depended 
on the conduct of military officers on the frontiers, dian they 
have on any negotiations.”20 Mansfield asserts that negotiations 
could have preceded without Scott, provided both states were 
willing to settle peacefully. His role then, as commanding 
general, was to use his clout to stay a military confrontation on 
the border long enough for politicians to settle the dispute.
Scott’s long friendship with Lieutenant Governor Harvey 
buttresses this conclusion. The two men served opposite each 
other for a time as adjutants in the War of 1812 and often 
corresponded officially. Once during battle, an American force 
cut Harvey off from his party. As a soldier prepared to take aim, 
Scott knocked the rifle from his hand and commanded, “Don’t 
kill our prisoner!” Harvey subsequently escaped, but Scott’s 
order saved his life. Since that time, both men had privately 
corresponded.21
Upon his arrival in Washington, Scott remained for several 
days to help pass two bills through the Senate to increase federal 
military support. On February 28, Congress voted to give Van
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Buren power to call all military and naval forces of the United 
States into service as he “deemed it advisable.”22 Congress also 
authorized Scott to extend the militia’s time of service from three 
to six months and appropriated $10 million to carry out the 
resolutions.
W hen Van Buren sent Scott to Maine, his exact charge was to restore peace and “enforce the determination of the Governm ent.” Secretary 
of War Joel Poinsett authorized Scott to use regular army troops 
and the combined militias of Maine and Massachusetts. As the 
Army’s most distinguished general, Scott symbolized a strong 
military position, yet his reputation as a “pacificator” reduced 
the sense of threat in Great Britain.23 With the Fox-Forsyth 
agreement in hand and backed with the extended powers of the 
military, Scott left for Maine. His parting words to President Van 
Buren seemed almost prophetic: “Mr. President, if you want 
war, I need only look on in silence. The Maine people will make 
it for you fast and hot enough. I know them; but if peace be your 
wish, I can give no assurance of success. The difficulties in its way 
will be formidable.” Van Buren responded: “Peace with honor.”24 
On his way to Maine, Scott stopped in Boston to secure the 
aid of Massachusetts. There Governor Edward Everett greeted 
him warmly. In a special meeting with the Executive Council, 
Everett first praised Scott’s skill as a com m ander and then closed 
with his promise of “the firm support of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts.” This gave more credibility to Scott’s position as 
a military commander. Scott arrived in Portland, Maine, on 
March 6,1839, to cheering crowds. Many of his old soldiers from 
the War of 1812 were on hand and fully expected him to again 
take command against the British.25 However, word of the 
Fox-Forsyth agreement had already reached Maine, and the 
rumors of Scott’s peaceful intentions caused an uproar within 
the state. Maine was not about to let his presence ruin its war. 
One State Senator declared:
If the contemplated visit of General Scott to 
Maine is only to persuade a withdrawal of our 
troops from the disputed territory, or a relin­
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quishment of our present position, he might as 
well stay away. I had rather see the State deluged 
in blood, and every field bleached with the bones 
of our citizens, than should we retrace our foot­
steps and submit to British arrogance!26
Maine opposed the wording of the Fox-Forsyth agreement, 
which called on the state to withdraw its troops but did not 
require reciprocal action by New Brunswick. The citizens of 
Maine were told to leave the area before New Brunswick ex­
pelled them by force; Washington sold them out. Sentiment to 
keep the militia on the border remained strong, and newspapers 
fueled the fires of public passion.27 In Maine, Scott discovered 
that Major General Hodsdon received orders to march up the 
Aroostook Road and establish defensive positions along the 
route. Maine had already activated six of its eight divisions, and 
troops were massing on the border. The state and providence 
were fast approaching actual hostilities. Scott wrote later: had “I 
been a few days later in coming to the scene, the troops of the two 
countries would have crossed bayonets on the disputed terri­
tory.”28
A day after his arrival, Scott’s orders arrived from Secretary 
of War Poinsett directing him to confer with the governor of the 
state. General Alexander Macomb, the commanding general of 
the Army and Scott’s immediate superior, ordered all regular 
forces that could be collected to the border to aid Scott. With the 
combined federal forces and the militias of Maine and Massachu­
setts at Scott’s disposal, Van Buren expected to enforce the 
government’s will. Scott, however, was to “abstain from all 
armed interference, and from entering the disputed territory for 
any other purpose than to restore peace.”29
Poinsett’s order became an important part of Scott’s strat­
egy for dealing with Maine and New Brunswick. Poinsett only 
authorized him to use force to defend the nation, yet the Maine 
militia expected him to take immediate command of its forces. 
On the New Brunswick side, Harvey respected Scott’s talents as 
a general, yet trusted him as a negotiator and friend. Scott played 
to the expectations of both sides. To Maine he appeared as the
WINFIELD SCOTT AND THE AROOSTOOK WAR
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commanding general from Washington, ready to lead Maine’s 
forces to victory. To New Brunswick, his constant reassurances 
buttressed his role as the “pacificator” of the dispute.
Maine’s leaders saw Scott as a military hero ready to protect the state’s boundary claims; 
to New Brunswickers, Scott stressed his role as a “pacificator.”
Edward D. Mansfield, THE LIFE OF GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT (1846).
The First Artillery Regiment of the United States Army, 
previously stationed in Burlington, Vermont, established a post 
at Houlton to support Scott. To counter Maine’s force, New 
Brunswick had the British 69th and the 36th regiments garri­
soned at Woodstock, New Brunswick, supported by portions of 
the royal and militia artillery. The Canadian 11th Regiment was 
also ordered to report.30 The dispute was escalating to a national 
level, and Scott well understood the dangers.
From his headquarters in Augusta, Scott conveyed to 
Poinsett his apprehensions about the Maine militia on the 
border and the state’s dissatisfaction with the Fox-Forsyth Agree­
ment. However, since no conflict had yet occurred, he believed 
he had gained time enough to urge “m oderate counsels.” He 
speculated that Harvey held off his troops for one of two reasons: 
Either he waited on the arrival o f m ore forces, or he wanted to 
watch the actions of Maine before proceeding.31 Either way, 
Scott recognized his only chance to avoid war was to delay any 
border engagement. Once fighting began, there would be little 
chance of stopping it.
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To maintain this delicate course, he next turned to the 
Maine state legislature. His appearance before the body drew 
numerous onlookers. Scott thanked the audience for its “hearty 
reception,” and proclaimed that should war come, he would “be 
glad to be found shoulder to shoulder -  breast to breast -  with 
such soldiers.”32 These were the words Maine waited to hear: 
Scott was willing to lead the fight, should it be necessary.
Scott wrote his first letter to Governor Harvey on March 9, renewing their friendship. Although he addressed his letter from “Army Headquarters,” he 
displayed a clearly peaceful aim. He expressed his sincere hope 
that their “personal friendship, commenced in the field, and in 
opposite ranks,” would be “conductive to the preservation of 
peace.”33 Scott fully explained Maine’s grievances with the 
Fox-Forsyth Agreement and proposed that Harvey rescind his 
threat to expel the Maine militia by force. He added that Maine 
felt the need to retain the posse in the disputed territory; if New 
Brunswick agreed to this point, a peaceful setdement could 
surely be arranged. To give further assurance of the peaceful 
nature of his presence, he ended the letter: “I will add, that I have 
not assumed, and do not expect to assume, any command over 
the forces which Maine has in the field; and if we can avoid 
collision on the northeastern frontier, it is not likely that the 
United States will proceed to levy a single regiment under a 
recent act of Congress.”34
Harvey established a relay of messengers from the provin­
cial light dragoons that allowed correspondence to travel from 
his capital in Fredericton to Augusta in only six hours.35 Con­
stant communication followed. Within days, both Harvey and 
Fairfield appeared ready to accept Scott’s compromise on the 
original Fox-Forsyth agreement. The only remaining danger was 
that someone on either side would disobey orders and fire across 
the border. Scott personally sent letters to officers on the border 
extending his confidence they would act “to maintain the faith of 
the United States.”36
On March 21, less than three weeks after his arrival, Scott 
wrote the final draft of the peace proposal. With only minor
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exceptions it was the agreement that Fox and Forsyth drew up in 
Washington. New Brunswick recanted its threat to expel Maine 
from the territory by force and allowed Maine to keep its civil 
posse in the area. Both states retained control over the territory 
they had effectively controlled before the incident began.37
Bickering continued, but the need for fighting had passed. 
Although neither side gained an advantage, each felt that its 
honor had been justly defended and considered the “war” a 
victory. In their orders to withdraw the troops, Fairfield and 
Harvey both gave General Scott credit for die peace. Harvey 
concluded his letter to Scott: “My reliance upon you, my dear 
general, has led me to give you my willing assent to the proposi­
tion which you have made yourself.”38
Almost three months after their mobilization, the members 
of the Bangor Rifle Corps returned safely to Bangor to a hero’s 
welcome. The company clerk reported their arrival “in a manor 
[sic] truly gratifying to our feelings.”39 So ended General 
Winfield Scott’s work as the pacifier of Maine’s Aroostook War. 
The large military force he secured assured Maine of his readi­
ness as commander, yet he convinced New Brunswick of his 
peaceful intentions and his determination not to take command. 
Because of his reputation as a negotiator, officials in New 
Brunswick trusted his word to seek peace, while the leaders of 
Maine waited for him before taking further action toward war. 
His well-calculated delay cooled the belligerent states long enough 
to allow him a free hand in negotiations. Not a single drop of 
blood was spilled over the border. Scott’s reputation as a friend 
of peace came to rival his recognition as a com m ander in war.40
Scott’s peaceful settlement of the crisis on the northeast­
ern border did a great deal to relieve tensions between Britain 
and the United States. Formal negotiations between Daniel 
Webster and Lord Alexander Ashburton finally resolved the 
boundary disputes in 1842. In the Webster-Ashburton treaty 
Maine received a smaller portion of the territory than it had 
earlier claimed, but the time for fighting had passed. The 
Aroostook “W ar” was over.
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